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Abstract
Some recent economic contributions have studied individual iden-
tity in terms of explicit choices and social categories to which a person
belongs to. According to Social Psychology, identity is also the result
of a process inuenced by self-regulation mechanisms. We model en-
dogenous identity-dependent preferences as the dynamic result of two
mechanisms: environmental pressure and the persistent e¤ect of past
socialization in the adaptation to new environments
We apply this model to environments where the agent must trade-
o¤ conicting utility functions, such as material and non-material pay-
o¤s, or self-interest and other-regarding preferences. The model shows
that heterogeneity in individual preferences, besides being the result
of socialization, cultural transmission and environmental incentives,
critically hinges on the feed-back of behaviour on preferences1.
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1 Introduction
Identity has recently received increasing attention in the economic literature.
In particular it has been used to highlight the e¤ect of social processes, like
the belonging to social categories, on individual behavior. In this paper, we
propose a model of endogenous identity-dependent preferences to foster two
strictly related objectives.
The rst one is to link three recent streams of the economic literature:
the literature on identity-dependent preferences (Akerlof, Kranton, 2000),
the literature on endogenous preferences (Becker, 1996) and the literature on
the dependence of individual preferences on socialization in a multicultural
environment (Bisin et al., 2006).
The second goal is to propose a compact analytical representation of some
critical perspectives and results of the social-psychological theories, with spe-
cial interest to the environments where an individual is subject to di¤erent
(and potentially conicting) identity references. This approach allows us to
derive a theoretical explanation of the emergence of identity-related patho-
logical behaviours (like extremism) that is consistent with the current Social
Psychology literature.
In this paper we introduce a dynamic perspective where identity results
endogenously from behaviour and previous experiences. To do so, we in-
troduce feed-back mechanisms that drive the endogenous change of identity
and, consequently, the identity-dependent preferences of the decision-maker.
More specically, we consider two distinct dynamic mechanisms that oper-
ate on the self-regulation of individual identity: environmental-pressure and
anchoring.
The rst mechanism refers to the fact that individual identity changes
over time according to a pressure to conform to the requests of the envi-
ronment where the individual lives. The second mechanism, anchoring, is
introduced in order to consider the case of an individual that has developed
a certain identity within a given social environment that, for some reason,
changes. This can be the case of a second generation immigrant that has
been socialized by its ethnic group and that, at a certain point of his life,
begins to interact with di¤erent social groups. Or it can be the case of a
2What opposes unites, and the nest attunement stems from things bearing in
opposite directions, and all things come about by strife.
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worker that has been educated to a specic organizational culture and, at
a certain point of its career, changes job and goes to a work place that has
signicantly di¤erent organizational values, norms or procedures (Mancini,
2001, 2006). As the literature reports, in all these cases the previous expe-
riences can "anchor" the process of adaptation to the new environment and
thus they a¤ect the process of identity formation (Erikson, 1982, Greenwald,
1980).
The paper is structured as follows. In next Section we review the liter-
ature on identity and endogenous preferences. In Section III we study the
evolution of identity as a deterministic optimal control problem, abstracting
from uncertainty, bounded rationality and from strategic interaction. This
framework is helpful to explain what factors inuence the behavior of people
over time and it suggests that heterogeneity in individual identity (and pref-
erences), besides being the result of socialization and cultural transmission,
explicit choices and environment incentives, is critically inuenced by the
individual history of people. In Section IV we provide a dual-self applica-
tion in which we focus on the intrapersonal conict that arises when people
are simultaneously subject to di¤erent social norms. This allows to consider
conicts occurring at two di¤erent levels. The rst one refers to a conict
between social environments characterized by di¤erent (exogenous) identity
references The second one, specically expressed by the dual-self assump-
tion, introduces also the conict within a given environment as expressed by
the weight given to di¤erent prescriptions. This setting provides an intuitive
interpretation of the relation between identity and social prescriptions. It
allows to introduce a classication of identity and behavior, showing why, in
a dynamic perspective, an agent can behave in pathological or extreme ways.
Section V concludes.
Our perspective develops the contribution by Akerlof and Kranton on
identity by considering a process in which identity changes and, consequently,
also the identity-dependent preferences of the agent change over time. The
endogeneity we introduce is driven by self-regulation mechanisms and is quite
di¤erent from Becker (1996), where the endogenous modication of the util-
ity function is driven by the formation and consumption of a capital good
that depreciates without explicit reference to conformist pressure or anchor-
ing dynamics. By considering identity as a complex construct that is both
the result of a conscious choice, as well as the unconscious result of the expe-
riences of the past and the pressures of the environment, we believe that this
paper can provide a complementary perspective to the economic contribu-
tions that consider identity as an explicit object of choice in a multi-cultural
3
environment, as in Bisin et al. (2006). To do so, we explicitly refer to three
streams of literature in Social Psychology that consider identity as a cog-
nitive process ruled by self-regulation mechanism of personal representation
(preferences) and behaviour; as a social process made of (multiple and sub-
jective) belonging to social groups and social roles (collective identity) and as
a motivational process whose objective is to stabilize personal representation.
2 Literature
2.1 Identity in Economics
The economic literature deals with identity in several contributions3.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Bisin and et al. (2006) consider identity
as the membership to social groups whose norms, costumes and culture are
reected in the individual preferences of the agents. In these contributions,
identity is at the same time a motivation for individual behaviour and a
choice of the individual. In Akerlof and Kranton (2000), identity is dened
as a persons sense of self that depends on the belonging to specic social
categories that determine specic behavioral prescriptions, a position that is
consistent with the sociological contributions by Tajfel and Turner (1979).
In this perspective identity a¤ects the individual preferences and it is repre-
sented as an argument of the individual utility function. In their proposal
identity can be chosen by the individual, it operates as an externality in peo-
ples interactions and it can be socially manipulated, for example through
advertisement. The contributions by Bisin and his coauthors (Bisin, Verdier,
2001; Bisin, Topa, Verdier, 2004; Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier, Zenou, 2006)
consider the relationship between selection of preferences within a popula-
tion by focusing on the concepts of cultural transmission (socialization) and
identity in multicultural environments. In Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier, Zenou
(2006), the authors explicitly refer to individual identity in order to add to
peer and parental pressure also the role of individual choice in ethnic identity
determination. Specically, individual identity is expressed by the weight at-
tributed to the prescriptions of the minority culture Vs. the majority one.
In a recent contribution, Bénabou and Tirole (2007) consider identity as a
result of an individual investment in beliefs when they are uncertain about
their preferences. This endogenizes the identity-related payo¤s in a setting
with incomplete information.
3For surveys, see Davies (2004) and Hill (2006).
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2.2 Identity in Social Psychology
In Social Psychology, identity is not just the result of a choice, as in most of
the economic contributions, but it can also be dened as the process through
which people dene their Self. Mancini (2001) proposes to organize the
literature on identity into three streams: cognitive, social and motivational
approaches.
Cognitive perspective. The cognitive perspective focuses on the process
through which self-knowledge or self-representation is elaborated and orga-
nized at a cognitive level. From this perspective, the Self is considered to be
an organized structure of self-representations that regulates the interaction
between the person and the environment. These images are both the in-
put and the output of a psychological process of self-regulation of behaviour
(Markus, Wurf, 1987). This means that the individual builds her Self over
time through a continual process of moving towards and away from various
kind of mental goal representation, and this movement occurs by a process
of feedback control(Carver, Scheir, 1998:2)4.
Social perspective. The concept of identity we use in this paper refers
to the concept of collective identity as proposed by Ashmore, Deaux and
McLaughlin-Volpe (2004):
"A collective identity is one that is shared with a group of
others who have (or are believed to have) some characteristic(s)
in common [...]. Such commonality may be based on ascribed
characteristics, such as ethnicity or gender, or on achieved states,
such as occupation or political party [...]. This shared position
does not require direct contact or interchange with all others who
share category membership; rather, the positioning is psycholog-
ical in nature [...] dened here in terms of a subjective claim or
acceptance by the person whose identity is at stake [...]. That is,
although others may refer to one in terms of a particular social
category, that category does not become a collective identity un-
less it is personally acknowledged as self-dening in some respect"
[Ashmore et al., 2004:81].
Collective identity thus generalizes the more familiar concept of social
identity (Tajfel, Turner, 1979) by referring to the subjective belonging to
social groups and/or social roles of a person. The social perspective on
4A mental goal refers to any salient goal that motivates individual behaviour and that
is determined by, for example, the preferences of the individual, by the social environment
and the kind of task the individual has to carry over.
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identity emphasizes the role of the social environment within which identity
is developed. Within this perspective we can nd both the theory proposed
by Mead (1932) and the Social Identity Theory by Tajfel and Turner. Meads
contribution considers, in a nutshell, the self as a social construct that results
from repeated interactions with other people belonging to the same group or
community. Rosemberg (1988) and Turner (1968, 1987) developed on these
premises, arguing that the social nature of the self depends on the di¤erent
roles within which people identify themselves and the di¤erent environments
they have lived in. Turner, in particular, underlines that the concept of the
self is a selective organization of values and models of behaviour that are
learned through social interaction. In this perspective the social norms (or
the culture) of a community are the building blocks for the construction of
self. The Social Identity Theory focuses on the elements of the self that
depend on the belonging to particular groups or social categories that are
determined, for example, on ethnic, gender, professional or religious bases.
Motivational perspective. The motivational approaches to identity con-
sider the psychological and social needs as the engine for the construction
of identity. A motivation for the management of identity is the search for
coherence and continuity in the perception of self. The main contributions
in this eld are Erikson (1968, 1982) and Marcia (Marcia et al., 1993). Erik-
son considers the formation of identity as a psycho-social process that in-
tegrates the abilities, beliefs and childhood experiences with the individual
expectations and the requests of the social environment. Marcia develops
Eriksons proposal in the Paradigm of Identity States. This perspective
suggests the importance of a stable identity as a psychological need, an argu-
ment that is taken also by the cognitive perspective (Greenwald, 1980) when
considering a tendency to conservatorismin the representation of individ-
ual identity. The motivational approach thus suggests that the evolution of
identity and individual behaviour are driven, as the social perspectives claim,
by a conformism pressure that depends on the environment the individual
is embedded into. It also points out that there exists a need for stability
in the identity constructs. In an multi-cultural environment or when the
environment changes (which are situations that often occur in the present
society), these two drives can be conicting, a situation that is commonly
considered by the psychological and sociological literature on contemporary
multi-cultural contexts to be critical for the individual management of iden-
tity (Baumeister, Muraven, 1996; Berger, Berger and Keller, 1983, Bauman
2002).
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2.3 Endogenous preferences
The dynamic aspect of individual choice and behaviour has been introduced
in the economic literature by Becker (Becker, 1996) as the endogenous change
of a parameter of the utility function. More specically, Becker considers the
formation and consumption of a capital good (consumption capital, social
capital, human capital or a habit) that changes over time. As this a¤ects the
preferences of the agent, the dynamics of this capital good also a¤ects the
intertemporal behavior of the agent.
Other approaches on endogenous preferences do not focus on the individ-
ual: they consider the selection of a specic set of preference from a popula-
tion perspective. Bisin, Topa, Verdier (2004) distinguish three approaches.
The rst one concerns direct evolutionary selection mechanisms of specic
behavioral rules like, for example, altruistic versus. cooperative strategies
within a population (Gintis, 2003). Other scholars, like Guth and Yaari
(1992) or Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001), have proposed models of indirect
evolutionary selection where, instead of behavioral strategies, the selection
occurs on individual preferences. A third perspective focuses on cultural
transmission mechanisms in which the di¤usion of a specic pattern of pref-
erence distribution depends on direct socialization mechanisms (Bisin et al.,
2001, 2004, 2006)
Contributions from the psychological and sociological literature observe
that preferences may also change over time as a result of the management
of intrapersonal conicts. Interpersonal conict means that an individual
can evaluate an action according to di¤erent, potentially conicting criteria
(Elster, 1986, Schelling, 1978)5. Ainslie (1992), for example, suggests that
the intertemporal behavior of people is driven by the interaction of sequen-
tial motivational states within the person and that this can be the cause of
dynamically inconsistent behavior. This perspective has also been adopted
in some economic contributions on intertemporal choice where the same set
of alternatives is assumed to be di¤erently ranked according to a long or
a short run perspective (Bénabou, Pycia, 2002; Bénabou, Tirole, 2004, Fu-
denberg, Levine, 2005; Gul, Pesendorfer, 2001; Laibson, 1997; ODonoghue,
Rabin, 1999). Recently, this multiple-self approach to decision-making has
been justied on the basis of the literature on the cognitive processes that
occur within the brain. Accordingly, the intrapersonal conict would not
occur only between sequential selves over time, but also between a¤ective
or deliberative systems (Lowenstein, ODonoghue, 2004) or automatic and
5See Freud (1924) for a seminal reference in psychology, Stark and Deutsch (2004)
and Camerer et al. (2005) for some recent contributions in, respectively, sociology and
cognitive sciences.
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controlled processing of environmental stimuli (Benhabib, Bisin, 2004) that
simultaneously interact in the brain and a¤ect individual behavior.
3 The model
3.1 The static objective function
As in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we consider identity-dependent preferences
and we represent (collective) identity as a parameter a¤ecting the instanta-
neous utility function of the agent. Under standard assumptions, we assume
that the agents objective function depends on the behavior of the agent,
on her identity and on the environment in which she is living. This means
that, given a compact set X 2 Rn, the alternatives x(t) 2 X can be ranked
according to the following utility function
v(x(t); a(t); ae):
The utility function is continuously twice di¤erentiable and it is a negative
denite quadratic form; we assume that the standard assumptions for utility
functions hold, except for the fact that satiation is admitted6. The term
a(t) 2 [0; 1] represents the collective identity of the agent at time t and
ae 2 [0; 1] is a given environment-dependent identity reference. Through all
the paper, we assume that neither time nor the agent a¤ect the environmental
reference.
3.2 The dynamics of identity: environmental pressure
and anchoring
In the economics contributions on identity, identity is essentially a static
choice and a static parameter in the individual preferences. Nevertheless,
the Social Psychological literature argues that identity should also be con-
sidered as the result of a dynamic process through which the individual de-
nes her psychological belonging to a social group. This implies that the
individual behavior changes over time as a result of the interaction with the
environment. The theoretical model we propose studies the optimal path
of behavior and its e¤ect on individual preferences, as represented by the
variation of the identity parameter a(t) over time. To introduce the dynam-
ics of identity as a result of behaviour, we consider feed-back mechanisms
that drive the endogenous change of identity and of the preferences of the
6See the dual-self application in next Section for details and interpretation.
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decision-maker. As it is commonly assumed in Economics, behaviour depends
on preferences; moreover we also allow preferences to depend on behavior, as
they are endogenously inuenced, via the change in the value of a; by past
choices.
More specically, we assume the existence of two dynamic mechanisms,
that we call environmental-pressure and anchoring. The rst mechanism
refers to the fact that individual identity depends on a pressure to conform
to the requests of the environment where the individual lives. The environ-
mental pressure mechanism f(a(t); x(t); ae) is driven by a welfare-improving
criterion that drives identity in order to adapt it to the social environment
the agent is living in. Analytically, this mechanism is based on the partial
derivative of the objective function with respect to the identity parameter
a(t), so that
f(x(t); a(t); ae) = va(x(t); a(t); a
e): (1)
If this derivative is positive (resp. negative), this means that, given the
environment and the behavior of the agent, an increase (resp. decrease) in a
would increase her well-being.
The second mechanism, anchoring, is thus useful to consider the case
of an individual that has lived in a social environment that is signicantly
di¤erent from the one the agent is actually living in. Consistent with the
motivational perspective on identity, we consider the dynamics of identity
as a process directed at stabilizing the personal representations of the self.
So we assume that the identity references of the previous environment never
lose their motivational power and that they operate as an anchor for the
collective identity representations of the individual.
Consider a second generation immigrant that has been socialized to the
culture of its ethnic group (or family) and develops her identity with respect
to that specic environment. Alternatively, consider the case of a person
that has been working in a rm with a specic organizational culture. At
a certain point in time, the agent moves to a di¤erent social environment:
the second generation immigrant goes to work or study in a place where
a di¤erent identity reference exists, the worker changes workplace, etc. In
these cases, we assume that the previous socialization experiences create an
identity anchor am 2 [0; 1] (the superscript m stands for memory) to which
individual identity tends to come back according to the anchoring function
g(a(t); am): This function does not depend on individual behavior x, it is
continuously di¤erentiable and such that g(a(t); am) Q 0 when a(t) R am.
The combined e¤ect of the environmental pressure and the anchoring
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mechanism determines the transition equation for identity as follows:
_a(t) = f(x(t); a(t); ae) + g(a(t); am) (2)
Note that the environmental reference ae and the anchor reference am
are conceptually di¤erent. The environmental reference has both a static
and a dynamic e¤ect: the static e¤ect concerns the direct impact on utility
of the prescribed identity reference, while the dynamic e¤ect represents the
conformist pressure that induces identity to change to adapt it to the envi-
ronmental reference. The anchor reference, on the contrary, does not depend
on the current environment and it does not enter the instantaneous utility
function: its e¤ect only operates on the dynamics of identity and we assume,
for simplicity, that this e¤ects never fades away.
3.3 Static solution
Before studying the dynamic solution, some remarks on the properties of
the static solutions are useful for later comparison. To do so, we consider
the optimal choice of x as if no self-regulation mechanism existed. In other
words, we consider the static case where both the type of agent (i.e. her
identity a) and the environmental reference ae, are exogenously given. The
static problem is the following:
max
x2X
v(x; a; ae) (3)
s.t. M = px (4)
with a 2 [0; 1], for any t; p 2 Rn is a given vector of prices and M a xed
available endowment. Given the strict concavity of the function, the internal
solution xs = xs(a; ae; p;M) to the static problem is unique.
For later comparison note that, could the individual choose her identity
and the corresponding behavior, she would choose the combination of identity
and behavior that allows reaching the global maximum (if it exists) of the
objective function. This (static) welfare-maximizing combination of identity
and behavior (aG; xG) depends on the environmental reference ae and, if
belonging to the compact set [0; 1]X, it satises the following conditions:
vx(a
G; xG; ae) = 0 (5a)
va(a
G; xG; ae) = 0 (5b)
As we will see, there are conditions that allow this global solution of
the static maximization problem to be also the steady state solution of the
10
dynamic problem. This means that, even though we do not allow the agent
to directly choose her identity parameter a, there are conditions that allow
the path of choices to correctly feed-back on preferences in order to ensure
the highest utility to the agent.
3.4 Dynamic solution
By focusing on a dynamic framework, we want to study the evolution of
identity due to the feed-back e¤ects of choices on preferences. This means
that there is a circular relationship between preferences and choices. As a
consequence the optimal choice in the dynamic framework can be di¤erent
than the corresponding optimal static choice, depending on the persistence
of past experiences.
In order to focus our attention on the endogenous change of preferences
over time, we consider a simplied framework in which there is no interaction
with other agents; furthermore no uncertainty or ambiguity are allowed for,
so that our results do not hinge on informational issues. In an innite-time
horizon, the optimal path of behavior must solve the following program:
max
fx(t)g
Z 1
t=0
e rtv(x(t); a(t); ae)dt (6a)
s.t. _a(t) = f(x(t); a(t); ae) + g(a(t); am) (6b)
M = px(t) (6c)
a(0) = a0 (6d)
a(t) 2 [0; 1];8t (6e)
x(t) 2 X;8t (6f)
where ae and am are given, f(x(t); a(t); ae) represents the dynamic e¤ect of
the environmental pressure, g(a(t); am) is the component based on anchoring
and a0 is a given initial identity. We also require the general transversal-
ity condition for innite-time horizon problems, limt!1 ertH(t) = 0; to be
satised.
The current-value Hamiltonian of the dynamic problem is the following
(the time index is omitted):
H = v(x; a; ae) + [va(x; a; a
e) + g(a; am)] (7)
where  is the costate variable and f(x(t); a(t); ae) has been replaced accord-
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ing to (1). The corresponding canonic equations are:
_a = va(x; a; a
e) + g(a; am) (8)
_ = [r   vaa(x; a; ae)  ga(a; am)]  va(x; a; ae) (9)
For interior solutions xd, the rst order conditions on the Hamiltonian func-
tion are:
Hx = vx(x; a; a
e) + vax(x; a; a
e) = 0: (10)
Let F (a; ) be the function that, given a and , assigns the optimal
behavior (or choice) xd according to equation (10).
3.5 Properties of the steady states
Given the general form of the problem, we cannot dene the number and
positions of the steady states without a specic objective function and a
specic dynamics of identity. Nevertheless we are able to point out three
properties of a steady state pair (a; x). The rst one concerns the role of
the environmental pressure and the anchoring mechanism in identifying a
steady state solution. The second one points out the instability of the steady
state solutions. The third remark identies a class of steady state solutions
that coincide with the global optimum of the static objective function and it
points out that the persistence of anchoring leads to second best outcomes.
First remark. An internal steady state (x; a) must satisfy equation (8)
and (9) with equality. The rst one,
f(x; a; ae) + g(a; am) = 0; (11)
implies that the environmental and the anchoring mechanisms must compen-
sate each with the other, a condition that can be interpreted saying that a
steady state requires the environmental pressure on identity to have di¤erent
sign (but equal strength) with respect to the memory e¤ect of anchoring.
A second remark concerns the stability properties of the steady states,
properties that can assessed by eliminating the control variable x and ex-
pressing the dynamic system as a function of the state and costate variables.
After some computations (see the appendix the details), the dynamic system
becomes:
_a = va(F (a; ); a; a
e) + g(a; am) (12a)
_ = (r   vaa(F (a; ); a; ae)  ga(a; am))  va(F (a; ); a; ae): (12b)
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We can now determine the local stability properties of the steady states
that satisfy system (12) with equality by considering the following Jacobian
matrix:
J =

vaa + vaxFa + ga vaxF
 gaa  vaa   vaxFa r   ga   vaa   vaxF

=
"
vaa   (vax)2Hxx + ga  
(vax)2
Hxx
(vax)2
Hxx
  vaa   gaa r   ga   vaa + (vax)2Hxx
#
(13)
Since Tr(J) = r > 0; at least one eigenvalue has a positive real part, indicat-
ing that the steady states of the dynamic problem are unstables (i.e. saddles
or sources), but that in no case it is possible to get a sink (that would be
associated with two eigenvalues with negative real parts) or a cycle (purely
imaginary eigenvalues).
The third remark focuses on the utility that can be reached in the steady
state, showing that suboptimal results occur because of the long-lasting ef-
fect of the anchoring mechanism, and not because of any form of dynamic
inconsistency. In fact, by considering a standard intertemporal utility with
constant discount rate r 2 [0; 1], we are explicitly ruling out the possibility
that dynamic inconsistent behavior (i.e. divergence between planning and
implementation of the plan) arises. To see it, consider a feasible steady state
(a; x) that simultaneously satises with equality the rst order condition
(10) and the canonical equations (8) and (9). Consider the special case in
which the anchoring e¤ect is nil, g(a; am) = 0; a condition that occurs when
the steady state identity and the anchoring references are the same, a = am,
or when there is no persistence of previous socializations. Since (a; x) is
internal, it satises the following system of equations:
vx(a
; x; ae) = 0 (14a)
va(a
; x; ae) = 0: (14b)
meaning that the steady state pair (a; x) coincides with the global maxi-
mum of the static objective function (aG; xG): In other words, when anchor-
ing has no e¤ect, the optimal path of choices and identities is such that the
optimal identity aG and the corresponding optimal behavior xG (given the en-
vironmental reference ae) is reached. By reversing the argument, this means
that, whenever anchoring is not nil in the steady state, we should observe a
suboptimal steady-state solution. This is consistent with the idea that the
evolution of identity is a process that integrates the experiences of life, with
specic reference to the environmental references a person has been exposed
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to (Erikson, 1968, 1994). When past references persist, the adaptation of
the agent to the new environment is not optimal. An implication is that the
evolution of identity is a truly environment-dependent process since people,
even if subject to identical environmental incentives, will develop di¤erent
identities as a consequence of their personal history and, specically, to the
persistence of the previous environmental references.
In order to get a deeper understanding of the factors that inuence the
optimal path of choices and the endogenous evolution of identity, in next
section we propose an application that shows how certain steady states, be-
side being generically suboptimal, can be labelled as pathological solutions
in which the joint e¤ect of reinforcement and anchoring induce to people
"overshoot" and (rationally) make extreme choices.
4 A Dual-Self application
In this section we present an application to the model presented in the pre-
vious section. This allows for an intuitive interpretation and classication of
collective identity in an environment where multiple social norms (or cultural
prescriptions) coexist. The application is also useful to introduce a classi-
cation of behavior and to explain the conditions that induce the emergence
of pathological or extreme behaviors.
Here we consider a social norm as a ranking over the possible behaviors
(i.e. it prescribes how to evaluate a behavior7). Under the usual assumptions,
a social norm can be represented as a utility function; the only remarkable
di¤erence with the usual utility functions is that satiation is admitted when
behavior perfectly satises the norm. Typically, in a multicultural society
people are simultaneously subject to di¤erent social norms or prescriptions.
This can be the case of a second generation immigrant that is both subject
to religious and secular prescriptions, or a worker that is both required to
cooperate and to compete with her colleagues.
In this context, we interpret identity a as the weight the individual gives
to each social norm she is subject to and we want to understand, i) what the
behavior of the agent is in a static framework, ii) how identity changes over
time as a consequence of reinforcement and iii) how behavior changes over
time.
7For an alternative approach based on descriptive norms, instead of prescriptive ones,
see Bicchieri (2006).
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To represent the prescriptions associated to each social norm, we con-
sider two exogenous, rational and di¤erent preference orderings, represented
by the (sub)utility functions n(x) and m(x). These functions are assumed to
be continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave. As there exist an opti-
mal behavior according to each set of prescriptions, the sub-utility functions
admit satiation when the social norm is perfectly satised, which occurs in,
respectively, xn and xm.
The existence of di¤erent social norms justies the existence of di¤er-
ent rankings on the same set of choice, which can be interpreted in terms
of intrapersonal conict. We assume that the decision-maker evaluates the
available alternatives x 2 X by considering the following linear combination
of two sub-utility functions
an(x) + (1  a)m(x); (15)
with a 2 [0; 1] that represents how the agent trades-o¤ the di¤erent social
norms. We interpret a as the collective identity of the decision-maker, as it
represents the relative importance of each social norm in the overall evalua-
tion of outcomes.
Given that a is dened over a continuum of values, we can easily classify
the identity and the behavior of the decision-maker. When a = 0 and a = 1;
the agent is said to have a polar identity, meaning that she is subject to only
one set of social norms. Analogously, we can dene as polar choices those that
correspond to xn and xm, i.e. the optimal behavior prescribed according to
each subutility function. If we consider a simplied problemwhereX = R, we
can also introduce a classication on all choices. More specically, we dene
a compromise choice as a choice x that lies between the optimal action of
each social norm (i.e. xm and xn), meaning that the individual is mediating
between the two norms. As we will see, in a static framework a polar identity
is always associated with a polar behavior; nevertheless in the dynamic model
this property in general does not hold. In particular, we show that a new
class of behaviors those that stay out of the interval [xm; xn] -we call them
extreme-choices- can emerge even if identities are not polar8.
We assume also that there exists a stable, exogenous identity reference
value ae given by the (social) environment and that deviating from this ref-
erence yields disutility to the agent. This disutility can be due to the actions
8Without loss of generality, we can assume xm < xn:More generallly, we dene a
compromise choice a value of x such that jx  xuj + jx  xmj = jxu   xmj (with x 6= xu
and x 6= xm), a choice is polar if the previous equality holds and x = xu or x = xm. A
choice is extreme if x is such that jx  xuj+ jx  xmj > jxu   xmj :
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of people that react to the deviant identity of the agent (see Akerlof, Kran-
ton, 2000 for the case of gender identity) or peer-pressure, but it could also
be interpreted as the consequence of an internal (psychological) sanctioning
mechanism, such as guilt. We assume this direct disutility cost to depend
only on the distance between a and ae and we represent it with the convex
cost function c(a; ae).
The objective function of the agent is given by the aggregation of the dual
utility function with the disutility cost of deviating from the given exogenous
reference ae as follows9:
v(a; x; ae) = an(x) + (1  a)m(x)  c(a; ae) (16)
This implies that the environmental pressure function in the transition equa-
tion is given by:
f(x; a; ae) = [n(x) m(x)]  ca(x; ae): (17)
The rst part of the expression (17) is the di¤erence in the relative desirability
that the two preference orderings induce. The second one represents the
conformist e¤ect and is given by the marginal cost of deviance from the
environmental reference ae: This implies that the disutility cost of deviance
does not only have a direct impact on the agents well being, but it also has
an endogenous e¤ect on the evolution of identity.
As anticipated in the previous section, we want to study also the e¤ects
of a change in the social environment. To do so, we assume that there exists
an exogenous reference anchor am that inuences on the evolution of identity
through the function g(a; am). This implies that the dual-self application
allows to consider conicts occurring at two di¤erent levels. The rst one
refers to a conict between social environments characterized by di¤erent
(exogenous) identity references The second one, specically expressed by the
dual-self assumption, introduces also the conict within a given environment
as expressed by the weight given to di¤erent prescriptions.
9Note that this function is strictly concave in both arguments, as vxx = auxx + (1  
a)mxx < 0 and vaa =  caa < 0, but that this does not guarantee the joint concavity
in both variables, that is to be explicitly assumed. When this is not the case, boundary
solutions -whose position critically depends on the size of the compact set [0; 1]  X-
emerge.
16
4.1 The static problem
In a static environment in which a(t) = a for any t; the agent solves the
following problem:
max
x2R
v(x; a; ae) = an(x) + (1  a)m(x)  c(a; ae) (18)
some remarks on the static solution xs = xs(a; ae):
1. xs depends, as one would expect, only on the partial derivative of the
objective function
vx = anx + (1  a)mx = 0: (19)
Note that the disutility term has no e¤ect on the optimal choice so
that, in the static framework, having an identity di¤erent from the
environmental reference ae simply determines a xed unavoidable cost
of deviance.
2. Since the foc can be written as nx(a;x
s)
mx(a;xs)
=  1 a
a
, the term nx
mx
computed
in xs is negative for any a 2 (0; 1)10, indicating that xs must stay
in a position where the marginal sub-utility functions have di¤erent
signs. This means that the optimal choice must trade-o¤ the marginal
increases of one sub-utility function with the marginal decrements of
the other sub-utility function. We interpret a solution with such a
property as a compromise solution because it stays between the two
optimal points: xs 2 (xm; xn)
3. When the individual has a polar identity (i.e. a = 1 or a 2 0), then
also the optimal static solution is polar: xs = xn (or xs = xm)
4.2 The dynamic problem
The current-value Hamiltonian of the dynamic problem is the following (the
time index is omitted when no confusion arises):
H = an(x)+(1 a)m(x) c(a; ae)+[n(x) m(x) ca(a; ae)+g(a; am)] (20)
10The expression uxmx can be interpreted in terms of marginal rate of substitution. This
can be seen considering, for example, an objective function such as v(a; x; y; ae) = au(x)+
(1   a)m(y)   c(a; ae) and a budget constraint like pxx + pyy = w, where x and y are
consumption goods, px and py their prices and w the individual endowement.
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where  is the costate variable and, according to the discussion in the pre-
vious paragraph, f(x; ae) has been substituted by n(x)   m(x)   ca(a; ae).
We also require the general transversality condition for innite-time horizon
problems, limt!1 ertH(t) = 0; to be satised.
For interior solutions xd, the rst order conditions on the Hamiltonian
function are:
Hx = (a+ )nx + (1  a  )mx = 0: (21)
The corresponding canonic equations are:
_a = n(x) m(x)  ca(a; ae) + g(a; am) (22)
_ = (r + caa(a; a
e)  ga(a; am))+m(x)  n(x) + ca(a; ae) (23)
With respect to the static solution xs, some remarks on condition (21) are
noteworthy.
1. When  6= 0, the static and dynamic solutions are di¤erent.
2. Given a, the distance between the static and the dynamic optimal
behavior depends on the value of the costate variable : Equation (23)
tells us that such a value of  depends onm(x) n(x). This implies that
xd depends on the objective function according to two channels. The
rst one is represented by the marginal sub-utility functions (as in the
static case). The second one, which emerges only in a dynamic setting,
is given by the relative desirability of behavior according to the two
social norms. As a consequence, if an exogenous shock S occurred to
one set of norms implying an increase in the relative desirability of this
norm (e.g. if the new subutility function ~n(x) were ~n(x) = n(x) + S),
this shock would not have any inuence in the static framework in
which the agent cannot change her identity. Nevertheless, in a dynamic
setting the shock would a¤ect the optimal behavior of the agent via the
e¤ect on the costate variable.
3. If  <  a or  > 1  a, then the marginal rate of substitution in xd is
positive. This means that the dynamic solution stays in a zone where
there is no conict between the two sub-utility functions. For example,
if  <  a, it can be the case that the static utility would increase if xd
increased11. In a static framework this would induce x to increase. Yet,
when we introduce self-regulation mechanisms, it can be optimal not
to do so, as an increase in xd could induce a change in a that negatively
a¤ects (given the value of ) the dynamic objective function.
11This occurs when both sub-utility functions are increasing and, more specically, when
the following conditions hold: ux(a; xd) > mx(a; xd) > 0. See the Appendix for details.
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4. A related consequence of the previous remark is that the optimal dy-
namic choice of xd can lie outside the interval [xm; xn]. In other words,
the agent can nd it optimal to make extreme (dysfunctional) choices
that do not mediate between the marginal e¤ects of the two sub-utility
functions.
4.3 Comments on the dual-self application
This dual application is useful for understanding the relation between iden-
tity and behavior over time by considering an individual that moves from
a multicultural environment to another one. In a static framework, if the
agent has a polar identity, the optimal behavior coincides with one of the
two optima. If the agent has an intermediate identity, the optimal behavior
will always lay between the optima of the two social norms. Nevertheless, in
a dynamic framework we can also nd optimal behaviors that do not mediate
and do not coincide with the optimal prescriptions of each norm. This can be
the case of religious extremism of a second generation immigrant that neither
follows the religious prescriptions, nor the secular culture, and that behaves
in such a way that she is exacerbating the prescriptions of both social norms.
Another example concerns food consumption in which a person is typically
simultaneously subject to the standards proposed by the family and those
advertised by the mass-media. In this situation, pathological behavior means
that the person nds it optimal too eat too little, or too much, with respect
to both standards, as it is the case of anorexia and bulimia.
Our explanation for this behavior does not rely on self-control problems
(Ainslie, 1991, Laibson, 1997). Indeed, in our model, what is planned will be
faithfully implemented in order to reach the steady state solution which, as
shown above, can not coincide with the combination of identity and behavior
that best ts the current environment the agent lives in. According to
the model we propose, this behavior is the result of the management of
the simultaneous conict between norms and the dynamic conict between
di¤erent social identity references. Since we consider full information, our
explanation of pathological behavior is also di¤erent from the explanation
based on self-signalling, which concludes that dysfunctional behavior can be
observed when people are uncertain about their own identity and infer them
from their past choices in order to signal to future selves the belonging to a
certain type (Bénabou, Tirole, 2007).
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5 Conclusions
This paper studies the dynamics of individual identity and the endogenous
evolution of preferences by explicitly including some relevant insights from
the Social Psychology literature. The goal is to improve the economic under-
standing of the processes that dynamically inuence the behaviour of people
over time by studying the evolution of identity-dependent preferences.
In the model we propose, identity is not an explicit choice of the agent,
neither a static category she is ascribed to. We study identity as the result of
a dynamic process that depends on self-regulation mechanisms. We propose
and study two specic kinds of mechanisms. According to environmental
pressure mechanism, identity changes over time in order to increase the well-
being of the agent, given her past actions. The second mechanism, anchoring,
refers to the persistence of old identity references and their e¤ect on an
individual living in an environment where a di¤erent reference exists.
As it turns out, identity is path-dependent and heterogeneity between
agents is shown to critically hinge on environmental changes, as well as in-
dividual behavior. We identify conditions for internal steady states to cor-
respond to global maxima, as well as conditions that determine paths of
behaviour leading to polar identities. The model also shows that, when the
individual anticipates the e¤ects of current choices on identity and future
behaviour, pathological behaviours can emerge, i.e. behaviours that are far
from all the relevant social prescriptions. This result is due to the endogenous
e¤ect of actions on preferences, so that the agent chooses extreme behaviors
in order to prevent her identity from changing.
The model we propose o¤ers a complementary perspective for study-
ing endogenous preferences, with respect to Beckers (1996) habit formation
model, by explicitly introducing insights from Social Psychology. The dual-
self application shows that the model can be usefully applied to a variety of
decision-making contexts in which intrapersonal conict occurs, as it is the
case of the literature studying how people trade o¤material vs. non material
gains, self-interest versus other regarding preferences, short-run vs. long-run
concerns.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of the dynamic system as a function of
a and 
For expositional easiness, we write the current-value Hamiltonian function
and the canonic equations as follows:
H = v(a; x; ae) + [va(a; x; a
e) + g(a; am)] (24)
_a = va(a; x; a
e) + g(a; am) (25a)
_ = (r   ga(a; am)  vaa(a; ae))  va(a; x; ae) (25b)
Note that the functions g; ga only depend on a. The foc for an internal
solution are:
Hx = vx(a; x; a
e) + vax(a; x; a
e) = 0 (26)
thus implicitly dening the optimal value of xd as a function of the state and
costate variables:
xd = F (a; ) (27)
The specic value of xd depends on the specic functional forms. Let us now
totally di¤erentiate (27) and (26):
dx = Fada+ Fd (28)
24
Hxxdx+Haxda+Hxd = 0: (29)
Since Hx = vax; we can rewrite (29) as:
Hxxdx+Haxda+ vaxd = 0
to obtain
dx =  Hax
Hxx
da  vax
Hxx
d (30)
Equating the coe¢ cients of (28) and (30) we get:
Fa =  Hax
Hxx
=   vax
Hxx
= F: (31)
By substituting (27) in system (25) we get:
_a = va(a; F (a; )) + g(a; a
m) (32a)
_ = (r   ga(a; am)  vaa(a; ae))  va(a; F (a; )): (32b)
7.2 Conictual, polar and extreme dynamic choices
Rewrite the foc (10) as nx(a;x
d)
mx(a;xd)
= 1   1
a+
to show the relation between the
marginal rate of substitution nx(a;x
d)
mx(a;xd)
and (a+ ) (see Fig. 1)
1.510.50-0.5-1-1.5
10
5
0
-5
-10
a+p
u'/m'
Figure 1: Plot of the marginal rate of substitution as a function of (a+ ):
We can distinguish 3 cases:
Compromise choices, which occur when (a + ) 2 (0; 1): This implies
nx(a;xd)
mx(a;xd)
< 0; meaning that either
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1. nx(a; xd) > 0 > mx(a; xd), or
2. mx(a; xd) > 0 > nx(a; xd):
This case can be interpreted by saying that, given a; the optimal dynamic
solution xd requires a mediation between the two sub-utility functions.
Polar choices: occurring in two cases:
1. (a+ ) = 0; so that mx(a; xd) = 0 and xd = xm
2. (a+ ) = 1; so that nx(a; xd) = 0 and xd = xn
Extreme choices, occurring in two cases:
1. (a+) < 0, so that nx(a;x
d)
mx(a;xd)
> 1: This case requires xd to stay in a zone
where both sub-utility functions are either increasing or decreasing in
x, i.e. either nx(a; xd) > mx(a; xd) > 0, or nx(a; xd) < mx(a; xd) < 0
2. (a+) > 1, so that nx(a;x
d)
mx(a;xd)
2 (0; 1) This case requires eithermx(a; xd) >
nx(a; x
d) > 0, or mx(a; xd) < nx(a; xd) < 0:
26
